is infectious and inspiring, and your keen clinical insights have been a great inspiration for each of us in our own ways. In our work with you, we gained knowledge of a broad range of areas within psychology and came to recognize research as a way of answering critical questions regarding human experience. More importantly, for each of us, the experience of working with you contributed to a subtle, yet cumulatively powerful, evolution in our experiences of personal efficacy, our capacities for intimacy, and our abilities to parlay our interests into productive directions. Thank you for all that you have done on our behalf. We know we are not alone in our sentiments, but we are truly appreciative.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The contributions of Sidney J. Blatt

John S. Auerbach, Kenneth N. Levy, and Carrie E. Schaffer

Within the field the field of clinical psychology, contributors who are both psychoanalysts and leading empirical researchers are, epidemiologically speaking, increasingly rare, and contributors who are analysts, researchers, and leading personality theorists are rarer still. Yet one figure who has made extensive contributions as an analytic clinician, as a researcher, and as a theoretician is Sidney J. Blatt, professor of psychiatry and psychology at Yale University and, for more than 35 years now, chief of the Psychology Section in Yale University's Department of Psychiatry. In his long, distinguished career, Dr. Blatt (Sid, as we prefer to call him) has been a leading figure in both empirical psychology and psychoanalysis. In addition to being trained as a psychoanalyst, he has conducted extensive research on personality development, psychological assessment, psychopathology, and psychotherapeutic outcomes. He is considered an expert in the areas of mental representation (e.g., Blatt 1995b; Blatt, Auerbach and Levy 1997) and internalization (e.g., Behrends and Blatt 1985; Blatt and Behrends 1987), as well as on the Rorschach Inkblot Test (e.g, Allison, Blatt and Zimet 1968; Blatt 1990). He has studied extensively the differences between relational and self-definitional forms of depression (Blatt 1974; Blatt and Shichman 1983) and was doing so years before cognitive-behavioral theorist Aaron Beck (1983) proposed the similar distinction of sociotropy versus autonomy. Along with his many students and colleagues, he has developed several widely used measures, both self-report and projective, for assessing depressive style (i.e., relational versus self-definitional), self- and object representations, and boundary disturbances in thought disorder. Among these methods is a projective technique, the Object Relations Inventory (ORI), for collecting descriptions of self and significant others (Blatt *et al.* 1979).[1] Thus each year sees the completion of approximately 20 psychology dissertations in which his measures are used. A man of broad intellectual interests, he has also written a book on the implications of psychoanalytic and Piagetian developmental theories for art history (Blatt and Blatt 1984). In short, Sid has been a wide-ranging and productive scholar in a career of more than 40 years' duration, and throughout this career, he has been committed to the proposition that it is not only possible but also essential to investigate psychoanalytically derived hypotheses through rigorous empirical science. Equally important is that, in those 40 years, he has been committed to training students who also hold to the perspective that psychoanalytic ideas can be validated and refined through empirical test, and we, as editors of this volume, constitute a testament to that commitment. Indeed, it is particularly important that one of the contributors to this book, Paul Wachtel, was Sid's first dissertation student and that one of its editors, Carrie Schaffer, was his most recent.

For these many reasons, not least of which is his personal influence on all of us as a mentor and teacher, we believe that a volume honoring Sid Blatt's many contributions to both psychoanalysis and clinical psychology is long overdue. The present Festschrift volume is our attempt not only to honor these contributions but also to disseminate them more broadly within both psychoanalysis, where empirical research is increasingly neglected, and clinical psychology, where psychoanalysis is increasingly ignored.

Sidney J. Blatt: a biography in brief

A Philadelphia native and the oldest of three children, Sid was born October 15, 1928, to Harry and Fannie Blatt. Sid was raised in modest circumstances. He grew up in a Jewish family in South Philadelphia, where his father owned a sweet shop and where his family lived in the apartment upstairs. But this statement does not fully capture the nature of Sid's background. According to Sid, his father was the third child born to Sid's grandmother, but this woman died, perhaps in childbirth, when Sid's father was just three or four years old. Sid's grandfather then married a woman who had three children of her own by a previous marriage, and the new marriage in turn produced three more children. In consequence, Sid's father was raised in circumstances marked by maternal loss and economic poverty. He was forced, as the eldest son, to leave school after the sixth grade to help support his family, with its numerous half-siblings and step-siblings, although Sid recalls him as an intelligent man who worked hard, running his store seven days a week, 16 hours a day, and who read widely in the left-wing press.

One memory of his father was particularly important to Sid. He recalls that every year he would accompany his father to the cemetery where his grandmother, his father's mother, was buried, and there Sid would hold his father's hand and attempt to console him as his father wept over the grave. Sid also recalls that, at age 13, he accompanied his mother on a painful two-hour bus trip to New Jersey as she responded to an urgent phone call informing her that her father had just suffered a heart attack. He tried to reassure and console his mother during the trip while she, correctly anticipating her father's death, grieved his loss. Regarding these memories of his childhood, Sid says that it is no surprise that he eventually was to become interested in studying depressive experiences that focus on separation and loss. Another interesting facet of Sid's childhood is that, contrary to the (positive) stereotype about Jews and education, Sid was the only child of his parents to attend college. Sid was intellectually inclined from fairly early in life and recalls being moved when he saw Rodin's sculpture, *The Thinker*, at the Rodin Museum in Philadelphia. Nevertheless, his postsecondary education was not a foregone conclusion, given his family's difficult economic situation, but in addition, his parents were divided as to his academic ambitions. Sid recalls that his mother supported him in this goal but that his father was more skeptical. Indeed an emotional connection to his mother and a more distant relationship with his father may have been an important part of Sid's childhood. He recalls that, at age 9, he became disillusioned with his father for failing to support him in what he describes as some minor but symbolically important matter. Sid decided to run away from home. He defiantly packed his bags and walked out of the house. He had gone no more than a few blocks when he became aware that he could not remember what his mother looked like; he ran home in a panic. Sid says that this terrifying memory may be one of the roots of his lifelong interest in the mental representation of the important people in one's life.

Despite these childhood struggles, Sid eventually enrolled at the Pennsylvania State University in 1946. From that institution, he was to obtain both his bachelor's and his master's degrees. It was between his sophomore and junior years of college that he was introduced, by one of his fraternity brothers, to Ethel Shames, the woman who later became his wife. Sid recalls that his fraternity house provided cheap lodging and also a source of income; he washed dishes in the kitchen. In any case, he and Ethel dated for a few years and finally married on February 1, 1951, while he was in his master's program. He and Ethel were eventually to have three children, Susan (b. 1952), Judy (b. 1959), and David (b. 1963). Regarding the role that Ethel has played in his life, Sid also says that all of his professional accomplishments would have been impossible without her. He specifically mentions that, when they married, Ethel had been attending Temple University on a Senatorial Scholarship (i.e., a special academic scholarship for residents of Pennsylvania). When they married, she resigned her scholarship, left school, and went to work to support him. After the birth of their first child, she earned money by taking in typing jobs. Sid observes that Ethel would say that, when it came to career choices, he has always picked the one with the greatest opportunity and the least remuneration; this, Sid adds, is how he wound up at Yale. In any case, Sid says that, without Ethel's support, he never would have completed his Ph.D., and he adds that Ethel did not finish her own college education until 1976, when the children were finally old enough for her to return to school. She obtained a bachelor's degree in art history at Southern Connecticut State University

(SCSU) in Hamden, Connecticut, a suburb of New Haven. True to pattern, it was the discussions between Ethel and Sid regarding her college courses that led many years later to their book on cognitive-developmental theory and spatial representation in the history of art (Blatt and Blatt 1984).

Sid's interest in psychoanalysis began in high school with his reading of Freud's (1916–17) *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. Fascinated by Freud's descriptions of unconscious processes, Sid decided to become a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst and thus majored in chemistry and physics at Penn State, with a plan to apply to medical school. Unfortunately, Sid failed a double-credit organic chemistry course in his junior year at Penn State because of problems with a year-long laboratory project that he later learned, after he switched his major to psychology, were the result of red-green color blindness, a condition that, until then, he did not know he had. As a result, he had misperceived the color of his laboratory results. Despite this setback, Sid excelled as a psychology major and received A grades in all of the psychology courses that he took during his senior year.

Not surprisingly, it was as a psychology major at Penn State that Sid extended his earlier interests in psychoanalysis to an emerging interest in projective testing. But unfortunately, these emerging interests led to conflicts with some of the faculty there. For example, as an undergraduate, he took an abnormal psychology course taught by George Guthrie, a young faculty member who had recently earned his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. The professor gave a group Rorschach to the class with the intent of demonstrating how misguided the test was, but instead of rejecting the procedure, Sid was intrigued by how much his responses revealed about himself. Sid then had difficulty getting into the Penn State graduate program in psychology. While finishing his senior year, he applied twice for admission and twice was turned down. Then, with only a short time to go before the start of the 1950 academic year, he applied once again and this time was accepted. He surmises that a spot had come open at the last minute and that this was why the psychology department accepted him. In 1952, he was given a terminal master's degree, although he received honors for his thesis, a paper that was later published in *Archives of General Psychiatry* (Blatt 1959).

Sid then moved to Chicago, where he had taken a position as a counselor with the Jewish Vocational Service (JVS). At JVS, the facility director, William Gelman, who was attending the University of Chicago, thought that Sid would be a good student for the doctoral program. Sid called the psychology department and spoke to Charlotte Ellis, the graduate student adviser. He explained that he would be an atypical student who needed to work a few days a week, and she helped him to put together a schedule. From 1952 through 1954, Sid worked without vacation and accrued 66 days of leave. In 1954–5, therefore, he was able to take off two days each week, Tuesday and Thursday, from his job so that he could attend classes.

Unfortunately, in making this plan, he had not considered the cost of the tuition at the University of Chicago; whereas the cost of attending Penn State had been $40 for the year, it was $1000, a considerable sum of money in those days, to attend the University of Chicago. Sid recalls that he had to take a loan from the university that then took him years to repay. In 1955, he took his preliminary examination and earned a high enough score on the exam that he was awarded a fellowship from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). With this fellowship and a research assistantship with Morris I. Stein, he was able to leave his job at JVS and go to school full time. His parents, he recalled, were furious that he, a married man with a child, had left his job to go to school full time, but with his fellowship and his research assistantship, Sid was able to complete his Ph.D. in 1957.

As regards his academic and intellectual development at the University of Chicago, Sid found the "U of C an intellectual paradise" where he maintained an ever increasing list of "must read books and articles." He did his predoctoral internship, in 1955 and 1956, under the supervision of Carl Rogers, whom he still describes 40 years later, even after his analytic training, as a profound influence on his psychotherapeutic approach. From Rogers, he learned the crucial importance of empathy – of understanding how his patients experienced the world and of framing his therapeutic interventions from the patient's standpoint. He also worked, as noted, as research assistant for Morris I. Stein, who had been a student of Henry Murray's at Harvard. Stein, who emphasized projective techniques in his research on creativity, eventually served as the chair of Sid's dissertation ("An Experimental Study of the Problem Solving Process"), completed in 1957 and eventually published in the *Journal of Psychology* (Blatt and Stein 1959). Additionally, Sid had the opportunity there to take testing courses from Samuel Beck. Sid's recollection was that Beck's knowledge of the Rorschach was in fact brilliant but that Beck often could not articulate the rationale for his conclusions and, when challenged about them, would eventually appeal simply to his clinical experience. These appeals to clinical experience left Sid distinctly unsatisfied because, as a beginner, he could not learn how to arrive at the same inferences himself.

In 1957, Sid began a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Illinois Medical School and at Michael Reese Hospital's Psychiatric and Psychosomatic Institute (PPI), then headed by Roy Grinker, Sr. At the University of Illinois, Sid fell under the tutelage of Alan Rosenwald, a Sullivanian whom he considered a brilliant Rorschacher, and at PPI, he worked with Mary Engel and Sarah Kennedy Polka, both of whom had been trained in the Rapaport system at the Menninger Clinic, and also with Sheldon Korchin, who was chief psychologist. It was the Rapaport system that gave Sid the theoretical understanding of the Rorschach that Beck, only a few years earlier, simply could not give him at the University of Chicago, and it was Rapaport's ideas in general that gave Sid his first theoretical understanding of the workings of the mind, a way of linking motivation and cognition. Sid says that thoughout his graduate training he regarded Rapaport's (1951) *Organization and Pathology of Thought* as his academic Torah and Talmud.

After having finished his postdoctoral training, Sid worked as a staff psychologist at Michael Reese for a year, and then, when Sheldon Korchin left to go to NIMH, he was offered the job of chief psychologist. This was an offer that Sid decided he could not accept because it would mean supervising people who a year earlier had been his teachers. Instead, in 1960, he decided to leave Chicago and to join the Department of Psychology at Yale University as an assistant professor; he was also accepted for analytic training at the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis (WNEIP). Situated nowadays mainly in New Haven, the WNEIP at that time was centered in both Stockbridge, Massachusetts, and New Haven, and Sid hoped to have a chance to work directly with Rapaport, who had in 1948 moved east from the Menninger Clinic to the Austen Riggs Center and whose intellectual contributions Sid had come to admire enormously. Rapaport died suddenly on December 14, 1960. Although crestfallen at the loss of this opportunity, Sid had already established a relationship with Roy Schafer, his Yale faculty colleague, who in 1961 had completed his own analytic training at the WNEIP. From Schafer, who had coauthored Rapaport's magnum opus on psychological testing (Rapaport, Gill and Schafer 1945–6) and who had worked extensively with Rapaport at both the Menninger Clinic and Austen Riggs, Sid learned in greater depth the subtleties of Rapaport's thinking. In July 1963, after his friend and colleague Carl Zimet left New Haven for a faculty position in Colorado, Sid became chief of the psychiatry department's Psychology Section and had half of his time reassigned from the Department of Psychology to the Department of Psychiatry. Eventually, he would be spending almost all of his time in psychiatry, rather than psychology, and that is where he spends most of his time today.

From 1965 through 1968, Sid was also director of psychology at the newly established Connecticut Mental Health Center in the Department of Psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine. Meanwhile, he continued his analytic training at the WNEIP. He recalls that his analyst, William Pious, was considered a maverick within the institution, and this reputation surely must have appealed to Sid, whose life history thus far had shown him to have a rebellious spirit and who, as a psychologist in an institute of the American Psychoanalytic Association, an organization at the time quite hostile to nonmedical analysts, must have felt himself to be a bit of an outsider. In addition, there was the considerable expense of analytic training with which to contend, but Sid was awarded a fellowship for psychoanalytic training by the Foundations Fund for Research in Psychiatry, and he supplemented this award by teaching evening courses at Southern Connecticut. In 1972, he completed his analytic training at the WNEIP.

Since then, Sid has had numerous professional honors. In 1973 and again in 1977 and in 1982, he was a visiting fellow at the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic in London, England. His third stay there coincided, sadly, with the death of Anna Freud. In 1977, he was a visiting fellow at the Tavistock Centre, also in London, and that same year, he was in addition a visting scholar at the Warburg Institute of Renaissance Studies, at University College London, where he had the opportunity to work with Ernst Gombrich, and this relationship was crucial to the art history book that Sid and Ethel were later to write. From 1978 through 1989, he was a senior research associate at the Austen Riggs Center, and from this involvement came his book (Blatt and Ford 1994) on the process of change in long-term inpatient treatment. In 1988 and 1989, he was Sigmund Freud Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. At the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he was also director of the Sigmund Freud Center for Psychoanalytic Study and Research, Ayala and Sam Zacks Professor of Art History, and a Fulbright Senior Research Fellow. In 1989, he was awarded the Society for Personality Assessment's Bruno Klopfer Award for Distinguished Contributions to Personality Assessment. Over the years, he has also served as a visiting professor at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Beer Sheva, Israel, the Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas, University College London, and the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium. As Stein (this volume) records in the foreword to this Festschrift, he is the author or coauthor of more than 170 publications. In short, even in his mid-70s, Sid remains not only a renowned but a productive, generative, and creative psychologist, and this Festschrift is a testimony to his continuing influence, even in a biological and cognitive-behavioral age, as a psychoanalytic psychologist.

Sidney J. Blatt: intellectual contributions

When he arrived at Yale in the early 1960s, Sid, inspired by the pioneering efforts of Rapaport *et al.* (1945–6), focused his research efforts on psychodynamic interpretation of IQ testing (Blatt and Allison 1968). Although his Rapaportian approach to psychological testing (see Allison *et al.* 1968) reflected his interest in the relationship between cognitive processes and personality organization, as well as in the role of representational processes in both psychopathology and normal psychological functioning, the areas of work for which he was to become best known lay ahead. These were to include his model of representational development and psychopathology (Blatt 1991, 1995b; Blatt *et al.* 1997), his various unstructured techniques and rating scales for assessing representational aspects of object relations (e.g., Bers *et al.* 1993; Blatt, Brenneis *et al.* 1976; Blatt *et al.* 1979, 1988; Blatt, Bers and Schaffer 1992; Diamond *et al.* 1990, 1991), the two-configurations model of personality and psychopathology (Blatt 1974; Blatt and Blass 1992, 1996; Blatt and Shichman 1983), and the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire (Blatt, D'Afflitti and Quinlan 1976) for measuring the types of depression (anaclitic or relational and introjective or self-definitional). In essence, it may be said that underlying all of his thinking regarding personality development and psychopathology are two basic conceptual schemes, the cognitive-representational and two-configurations models. But although Sid's interest, influenced by Piaget and Werner, in the links between development and representation, was already evident in his early research, it was with his two-configurations approach to psychopathology, depression in particular, that he finally came into his intellectual own.

In 1972, as mentioned, Sid completed his psychoanalytic training, and his experiences with two of his control cases led him to formulate the anaclitic-introjective distinction (Blatt 1974). Although each of these two control cases at the WNEIP suffered from depression, one of them proved to be highly self-critical and guilt ridden, with much suicidal ideation, and the other emerged as highly dependent, wanting nurturance and desperately seeking emotional contact. From these clinical experiences, Sid proposed in 1974 that some depressed patients, whom he termed *introjective* because of their excessive superego introjects, are focused mainly on self-criticism, guilt, failure, and a need for achievement and that others, whom he termed *anaclitic* because of their need to lean on others for emotional support, are concerned mainly with loss, separation, abandonment, and a need for emotional contact. In later writings, Sid expanded this classification to apply to other forms of psychopathology (Blatt and Shichman 1983), as well as to normal personality development (Blatt and Blass 1990, 1992, 1996). As he expanded the scope of this model, he also became interested in attachment theory, primarily as a result of the influence of younger colleagues (see, e.g., Diamond and Blatt 1994; Levy, Blatt and Shaver 1998; Schaffer 1993), and his terminology shifted from anaclitic and introjective, both terms deriving from psychoanalytic theory, to the more inclusive distinction between *attachment* or *relatedness* on the one hand and *separateness* or *self-definition* on the other (e.g., Blass and Blatt, 1992, 1996; Blatt and Blass 1990, 1992, 1996; Blatt *et al.* 1997). Thus, this tension between relatedness and self-definition has been central to Sid's understanding of human life.

As he was formulating his theoretical ideas about the two-configurations model, Sid recognized that his theories needed grounding in empirical evidence. He and his colleagues developed the DEQ (Blatt *et al.* 1976), a self-report scale, and found that this structured questionnaire assesses the two types of depression, anaclitic (or dependent) and introjective (or self-critical), posited by his theories. The measure has now been validated in numerous studies (see Blatt 2004; Blatt and Zuroff 1992; Zuroff 1994; Zuroff, Quinlan and Blatt 1990), and an adolescent version of the measure has also been constructed (Blatt, Schaffer *et al.* 1992).

But although Sid is perhaps best known for his work on the two-configurations model, he has always developed his cognitive-representational understanding of personality and psychopathology in conjunction with his understanding of relatedness and self-definition, and this is evident even in the paper in which he first conceptualized the anaclitic-introjective distinction (1974). Much of that article is devoted to the delineation of a Piaget-influenced cognitive model of personality development. Briefly, in that article, Sid proposed that personality development proceeds from a sensorimotor-enactive stage, in which a person's object relations are dominated by concerns with need gratification and frustration, through a concrete perceptual stage, in which object relations are based on what the other looks like, an external iconic phase, in which object relations involve mainly what others do, an internal iconic phase, in which object relations involve mainly what others think and feel, and finally, a conceptual stage, in which all previous levels are integrated into a complex, coherent understanding of significant others. Sid was to use this model in developing the Conceptual Level (CL) scale for rating open-ended descriptions of parents and other significant figures. Sid linked these Piagetian ideas, together with concepts from Fraiberg (1969), A. Freud (1965), Jacobson (1964), and Mahler (e.g. 1968), in developing his views on boundary disturbances in Rorschach thought disorders. Specifically, he (Blatt and Ritzler 1974; Blatt, Wild and Ritzler 1975; Blatt and Wild 1976) argued, on the basis of research on disordered verbalization on the Rorschach, that thought disorder involves disturbances in the representation of psychological boundaries and that these disturbances are most severe in schizophrenia and less severe but still present in the diagnostic class that we have come to know as borderline personality organization. Sid and his colleagues (Blatt, Brenneis *et al.* 1976) used similar developmental concepts, mainly Werner's (1957; Werner and Kaplan 1963) ideas about differentiation, articulation, and integration in development, in the construction of the Concept of the Object Scale (COS) for Rorschach protocols. The theoretical assumptions underlying this scale, like those underlying the CL scale and Sid's work on boundary disturbances are that cognitive development and the development of object relations occur in parallel and that the emergence of psychopathology is closely linked to disturbances in the development of object relations and cognitive organization.

Gradually, therefore, Sid (Blatt 1974, 1991, 1995b; Blatt *et al.* 1997; Blatt and Blass 1990, 1992, 1996; Blatt and Shichman 1983) articulated a comprehensive, integrated model of personality development, psychopathology and therapeutic change. He referred to his model as a "cognitive morphology" (Blatt 1991) of normal and pathological development (see also Blatt 1995b; Blatt and Shichman 1983). In other words, using cognitive-developmental theory, psychoanalytic object relations theory, and, in his later work (e.g., Blatt 1995b; Blatt *et al.* 1997) attachment theory, Sid identified several central nodal points in the development of mental representations and delineated the relevance of these nodal points for personality development and psychopathology. Specifically, he proposed that, in the first three months of life, the chief psychological achievement is the formation of boundary constancy and that disruption of the establishment of intact cognitive-perceptual boundaries between independent objects is involved in many of the clinical features of schizophrenia. In the second six months of life, meanwhile, the primary psychological achievement is the formation of recognition constancy – i.e., the ability to recognize psychological objects, regardless of their emotional valence – and the emergence of this cognitive capacity at age 8 or 9 months, Sid theorizes, is an essential aspect of the development of interpersonal attachments. Then, in the second year of life, by age 16 to 18 months, the chief psychological achievement is the emergence of evocative constancy – the capacity to evoke the presence of a significant other in that other's absence. According to this model, severe disturbances in evocative constancy underlie borderline personality organization, and less severe disturbances in this capacity are linked to various levels of depressive psychopathology. In the third year of life, by approximately age 30 to 36 months, the child develops self and object constancy and therefore begins to understand the difference between the perspective of the self and the perspective of others. The consolidation of self and object constancy is, in this view, a precondition for the establishment, later in life, of a cohesive identity and mature object relations (see Blatt *et al.* 1996, 1998). In the fifth year of life, the child enters the world of concrete operational thought, and parallel to this cognitive achievement is the interpersonal ability to coordinate the perspectives of three participants in a triangular relationship; this capacity is necessary for the child's object relations to progress from preoedipal to oedipal configurations and, as regards psychopathology, underlies the classical neuroses. In early adolescence, formal operational thought emerges, and with it comes the capacity to appreciate the inner or psychological attributes of both self and other. Formal operational thought is necessary, per Erikson's (1963) theories, for identity formation and the development of the capacities for intimacy, generativity, and integrity, the adult stages of maturation.

What makes Sid's contribution here particularly powerful is that he uses this model to understand both normal and pathological psychological phenomena, and indeed his cognitive morphology underlies his analysis of the history of art (Blatt and Blatt 1984) as well. Furthermore, unlike many psychoanalytic thinkers, he does not use reductionistic concepts like fixation or developmental arrest to describe the developmental processes underlying psychopathology. Instead, using an epigenetic model derived from Bowlby (1973) and Waddington (1957), he recognizes that psychopathology arises from developmental deviations, in which maturation veers off from a central developmental line involving the integration of relational and self-definitional capacities and motivations, with pathology reflecting the overemphasis of one set of tendencies, as opposed to the other. Furthermore, following the ideas of Erikson (1963), Sid has extended his developmental model all the way from infancy to senescence, but recognizing that Erikson's model overemphasizes separation, individuation, and self-definition (i.e., autonomy versus shame and doubt, initiative versus guilt, industry versus inferiority, identity versus role diffusion, generativity versus stagnation, and integrity versus despair) at the expense of relatedness (trust versus mistrust, and intimacy versus isolation), he proposed interpolating another relational stage between those of initiative versus guilt and of industry versus inferiority in the Eriksonian model. In his first formulation of this idea, Sid termed this new stage mutuality versus competition (Blatt and Shichman 1983), and in his later writings, he referred to it as cooperation versus alienation (Blatt 1995b; Blatt and Blass 1990, 1992, 1996). His thinking here was that Freud's oedipal stage involved not only the fear of punishment for guilty wishes and competitive strivings but also the establishment of cooperative relationships in spite of relational conflict, not only self-definition but also relatedness.

In his most recent work (e.g., Blatt 1995b; Blatt *et al.* 1997; Blatt and Levy 2003; Diamond and Blatt 1994; Levy *et al.* 1998), Sid has reconceptualized his model of cognitive-affective development in terms of attachment theory. Thus, he has recognized that self-definitional forms of psychopathology most likely derive from avoidant forms of attachment and that relational forms of psychopathology derive from resistant forms of attachment (e.g., Blatt 1995a; Blatt and Levy 2003). Having already theorized that self-definitional and relational personality organizations have diverging cognitive styles, ideational and precise versus affective and global (Blatt and Shichman 1983), Sid has increasingly delineated connections between his model of cognitive-affective development and that proposed by Main (e.g., Main, Kaplan and Cassidy 1985) as a result of her work with the Adult Attachment Interview (see Blatt 1995a, 1995b; Blatt *et al.* 1997). Thus, he increasingly sees the cognitive styles associated with various forms of psychopathology as reflecting basic attachment processes, and he has come to view the construction of object representations as rooted in the development of intersubjectivity and of a theory of mind (e.g., Auerbach and Blatt 1996, 2001, 2002; Blatt *et al.* 1996, 1998; Diamond *et al.* 1990). From this perspective, psychological maturity involves the capacity fully to appreciate the thoughts, wishes, and feelings of intimate others without losing one's own autonomous perspective. In other words, maturity involves a dialectical and dynamic balance between relatedness and self-definition.

Finally, as regards Sid's professional career, the last several years have seen him contribute to the literature on psychotherapeutic processes and outcomes, and this is unusual because so much of his work is theoretical, focused on issues of personality, personality development, and psychopathology, rather than on concrete questions like what changes in treatment and how. Nevertheless, following from his argument that there are clear differences between persons focused on relational issues and those who emphasize self-definitional issues, Sid has attempted to demonstrate that relationally oriented and self-definitionally oriented persons have differential responses to psychotherapy. Thus, in his reanalysis of Wallerstein's (1986) Menninger Psychotherapy Research Project (Blatt 1992), Sid found that self-critical patients responded better to psychoanalysis, with its couch and its increased distance between patient and analyst, and that dependent patients responded better to psychotherapy, with the increased support provided by the face-to-face therapeutic relationship. Meanwhile, in his study of therapeutic change in long-term inpatient treatment at Austen Riggs (Blatt and Ford 1994), Sid found that dependent patients changed most with regard to interpersonal functioning while self-critical patients, who tend to be ideational, rather than affective, in their orientation to the world, showed change primarily through improved cognitive functioning and decreased thought disorder. Most important, however, has been a series of reanalyses by Sid and his colleagues (e.g., Blatt *et al.* 1995, 1996, 1998; Shahar *et al.* 2003, in press; Zuroff *et al.* 2000) of the NIMH Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program (TDCRP). Using the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman and Beck 1978), Sid and his colleagues identified two factors in psychological functioning within the sample – perfectionism, which might otherwise be termed self-criticism, and need for approval, which might otherwise be termed dependence. They found that, regardless of the form of psychotherapy used (i.e., cognitive-behavioral, interpersonal, medication, and placebo), perfectionism had a negative effect on clinical outcome in short-term treatment of depression, presumably because patients with high standards were unlikely to resolve their problems after just 15 or 20 psychotherapy sessions. These findings prompted Blatt (1995a) to argue that one clinical group that would definitely need long-term treatment to effect change would be those he had identified as introjective or self-critical. In other words, these research findings suggested not only that personality differences are important in response to psychotherapy but also that the short-term treatments imposed on psychotherapy patients by managed care might have significant countertherapeutic effects on those patients who are high in perfectionism.

An overview of this book

In this volume, we present contributions from Sid's colleagues and students. In their various chapters, they address the main areas in which Sid has focused his intellectual endeavors: personality development, psychopathology, assessment, psychotherapy, and applied psychoanalysis. This book is therefore divided into five parts.

Part I of the book will focus on personality development. It was in his seminal 1974 paper, "Levels of Object Representation in Anaclitic and Introjective Depression," that Sid first articulated his theoretical position on personality development. In his writings, Sid posits that psychological development involves two primary maturational tasks: (a) the establishment of stable, enduring, mutually satisfying interpersonal relationships and (b) the achievement of a differentiated, stable, and cohesive identity. Normal maturation involves a complex reciprocal transaction between these two developmental lines throughout the life cycle. For instance, meaningful and satisfying relationships contribute to the evolving concept of the self, and a new sense of self leads, in turn, to more mature levels of interpersonal relatedness. Thus, Sid presents what he terms the *two-configurations model* of personality development. He also ties these two developmental lines to specific nodal points in the development of mental representations. The chapters in this part (by Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe, by Priel, and by Freedman) will examine the implications of Sid's ideas for personality development and functioning. In their contribution, Beebe *et al.* describe mother–infant interaction, so crucial to psychological development, as a dyadic communicative system. They also review the research literature in support of their perspective. Priel reviews research documenting how object representations develop in middle childhood through children's interactions with their parents. She also discusses the role of adoption in the construction of children's object representations. Freedman, meanwhile, discusses the roles of space and spatialization in the development of object relations and representations. In arguing his case, he integrates research literature with his clinical experience.

Part II will focus on psychopathology. In his many writings, Sid explicates the relationship between the two lines of personality development described above and two corresponding types of depression: (a) an interpersonally oriented (anaclitic) depression characterized by dependency, fears of abandonment, and feelings of helplessness and (b) a self-evaluative (introjective) depression characterized by self-criticism and feelings of unworthiness. He also theorized that schizophrenia can be divided into nonparanoid and paranoid subtypes on the basis of the two-configurations model. During the past two decades, Sid's original formulations regarding anaclitic (dependent) and introjective (self-critical) lines of development and the role of impaired and distorted representations of self and others have been expanded into a broader model of psychopathology. Additionally, Sid has proposed that level of psychopathology is associated with cognitive developmental level, such that, for example, schizophrenia is associated with impaired boundary representation, borderline states are linked to disturbances in evocative constancy, and higher-level, neurotic disturbances require the establishment of self and object constancy. The chapters in this part (by Zuroff, Santor and Mongrain, by Khatri and Segal, by Fleck, and by Cramer) will examine the contributions of Sid's theoretical model for understanding psychopathology. Thus, Zuroff *et al.* present research evidence in support of the specificity hypothesis – i.e., that dependent persons become depressed in response to separation and loss and that self-critical persons become depressed in response to failures in achievement. In their contribution, Khatri and Segal compare and contrast Sid's personality typology (anaclitic or dependent versus introjective or self-critical) with Aaron Beck's (sociotropy versus autonomy) in the understanding of depression. Fleck's contribution is an attempt, in this age of biological psychiatry, to demonstrate the complex interaction of psychosocial and constitutional factors in the etiology of schizophrenia. His views are consistent with Sid's regarding the link between psychosocial factors and the underlying cognitive disturbances in schizophrenia. They are also consistent with Sid's views on the essential role of long-term psychosocial treatment in the care of severely disturbed patients. Cramer, meanwhile, reviews her research with Sid, part of the study of therapeutic change at Austen Riggs, on defense mechanisms in severe psychopathology and also presents data on how defense mechanisms interact with intelligence in predicting patients' responses to psychotherapeutic treatment.

Part III will focus on issues in psychological testing and assessment. Throughout his career, Sid has been a major contributor to the research, clinical, and theoretical literature on projective assessment. He views the Rorschach and other projective techniques as methods through which both clinicians and researchers could gain access to the unconscious mental representations that he regarded as central to both normal functioning and psychopathology. He is also particularly interested in the assessment of object relations, once again in both normal and pathological functioning, and in the assessment of thought disorder. The three chapters in this part therefore address the three topics that have been most central to Sid's concerns regarding the Rorschach: mental representations (Ritzler), object relations (Lerner), and thought disorder in schizophrenia (Holzman). Ritzler's main focus is on Sid's contributions to the use of projective instruments in the measurement of object representations. He summarizes a complex research literature in this area. Lerner's overlapping chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to the implications of the Rorschach Inkblot Test for an understanding of object relations. Finally, in this part, Holzman discusses his research on the use of Rorschach thought disorder measures to differentiate among forms of psychosis, schizophrenic versus manic. He demonstrates that the Rorschach, an often maligned instrument, in fact provides a very effective means of differentiating among major classes of psychopathology.

Part IV will focus on psychotherapy and the treatment process. The main thrust of Sid's work in this area concerns two issues: (a) the implications of assessing mental representations and changes in representations for the study of the therapeutic process; and (b) the implications of the two-configurations model for current understandings of psychotherapeutic processes and outcomes. In this part, chapters by Fonagy and Target and by Luborsky, Andrusyna and Diguer will address issues of representations in the psychotherapeutic process. Fonagy and Target argue that psychotherapy and psychoanalysis have their action through a complex interaction between relational and representational factors, between the therapeutic relationship and therapeutic insight. Luborsky *et al.*, meanwhile, present some empirical findings pertaining to a topic that has received much theoretical attention in psychoanalysis – the role of narrative in the psychotherapeutic process. The chapter by Messer and McCann pertains to a subject that has informed Sid's entire career – the extent to which the study of psychoanalysis can be placed on an adequate empirical footing. They demonstrate how single-case methodology can be used to capture the complexity and richness of the psychoanalytic encounter while maintaining adequate empirical rigor.

Part V will focus on the links between psychoanalysis and broader cultural trends. In his work, Sid applied his representational and two-configurations models to developments in art history, the culture of narcissism, and developments in the history of science. In the spirit of Sid's contributions in these areas, two of the chapters will discuss the implications of the two-configurations model for an understanding of sociocultural phenomena. Wachtel's chapter demonstrates how the two-configurations model can be used to illuminate the psychodynamics of greed. Blass's chapter discusses religious faith in terms of the interacting developmental lines of attachment and separation. Another chapter in this part, that by Diamond, compares and contrasts psychoanalytic theories of narcissism with the social theories posited by members of the Frankfurt School. Diamond discusses how narcissism is both a psychological and a social problem. In the final chapter of the book, Holt discusses, from an empirical-scientific viewpoint similar to that embraced by Sid, the implications of postmodernism for psychoanalysis. Holt's concern is to uphold psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline, one that depends on empirical research if it is to advance, while at the same time disputing the argument, often advanced by postmodern thinkers, that a scientific approach is necessarily reductionistic.

Note

1 The ORI is sometimes also referred to as the Object Representation Inventory (Diamond, Kaslow, Coonerty and Blatt 1990; Gruen and Blatt 1990). The original technique (Blatt, Wein, Chevron and Quinlan 1979) asked participants to write brief prose descriptions of each of their parents; it was used in a nonclinical sample and was known as Parental Description. When the technique was adapted for use with psychiatric patients, it was administered in the form of an interview, and participants were asked to describe a significant other, a pet, self, and ther-

apist, as well as, per the original procedure, mother and father. This unstructured interview was called the ORI.

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